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Abstract: Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset and German philosopher Karl Jaspers were both born in 1883, and 
they both maintained the position that humans are principally historical beings. Therefore, as attested by this notion itself, 
there are points in which their philosophy coincides. Ortega argued that human beings have no nature, only history. His 
argument is that history as such is human nature; what is most natural about being human is the fact of being historical 
and thus always having historicity. Jaspers maintained the same position that in contemplating historicity, one's focus 
should not be on human nature in the strictly hereditary sense, because it is one's traditions, not the genetic makeup, 
that most make one to be human. Jaspers emphasizes the conversion of an existential historic consciousness into a 
consciousness of historicity that is similar to what can be understood in Ortega as historical perspectivism imbued with 
pragmatism.
Keywords: Jaspers, Karl; Ortega y Gasset, José; philosophy of history; philosophy of historiography; continental 
philosophy; Iberian philosophy; history; historiography.
implies that humans are existing, and live in limited 
freedom as a self that must navigate its way through 
concrete, temporal, historical circumstances. This is 
captured here in what can be considered historical 
perspectivism, a concept that is used in a similar way 
by both philosophers.
There is an important dialogue and analysis to be 
considered here that adds to the thoughtful scholarship 
on the metaphysics of humankind as historical 
beings, as well as on the philosophy of history and 
historiography. Most succinctly defined, history is 
the study of past events, and historiography is the 
subsequent interpretation we make of that data in the 
writing of history. As historical beings, philosophizing 
on the study, recording, and writing of history is 
therefore crucial to better understanding human 
experience and existence. 
The Spanish Philosopher José Ortega y Gasset and the 
German Philosopher Karl Jaspers were born in the 
same year, and they both maintained the position that 
humans are historical beings. Therefore, as attested by 
this notion, there are points in which their philosophy 
coincides.
Their overlapping notions of historicity can be 
summarized in terms of sharing the following key 
defining features. First, a human being is not comprised 
of solely nature in the strict biological sense of the term; 
rather, what humans have is history. Second, this leads to 
the presumption of the lack of static and fixed defining 
human attributes; as historicity is in constant flux since 
it exists in time. Third, this then means that human 
existence occurs in an incessantly flowing continuum 
that has historical determinacy, since humans are at 
any given time embedded in a historical moment. The 
fourth shared feature is that this historical determinacy 
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neo-Kantianism, and where his intellectual path now 
begins to more closely parallel with the one of Karl 
Jaspers. Particularly important for this study, Neo-
Kantianism incorporated historical elements into the 
philosophical discourse of the time. Moreover, both 
Jaspers and Ortega owe indebtedness for their notions 
of historicity to Wilhelm Dilthey, another case in point 
that lends credence to their overlapping philosophies. 
In Germany, Neo-Kantianism began to dominate the 
intellectual climate especially during the First World 
War and then continued on during the Weimar 
Republic.
Humans Have No Nature, Only History
The first noted way to conceive of this shared notion 
between Jaspers and Ortega of viewing humankind 
as historical beings is through the denial of nature's 
ontological foundation, in the strictly biological sense, 
and to replace it instead with history.
Jaspers declares: "Compared with nature, which 
is alien to me, history is the existence of my own 
essence."1 Moreover, if the broadest notion of history is 
simply applied as being past time, this would include 
apart from other elements of the past also the biological 
notion of heredity. "Hence man alone has a history, 
that is, he does not live only by his biological heritage 
but also by tradition. Man's life is not merely a natural 
process,"2 claims Jaspers. In this conception tradition is 
a central part of a human's historicity. "It is not heredity 
that makes us human," he maintains "but always 
the content of tradition."3 This relates to his notion of 
Existenz, and the idea of humans not just as existence 
but as existing, as a gerund—there is possibility, choice, 
potential—certainly this is an effective way to cope with 
the dismal times both philosophers lived in. Indeed, 
humans have choice, but can never start fully afresh, 
and so history is always carried along. Humans never 
cease being historical, though as historical agents we 
1 Karl Jaspers, Philosophy, 3 Volumes, transl. E. B. Ashton, 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 1971, here 
Volume 3, p. 161. [Henceforth cited as P with volume 
number]
2 Karl Jaspers, Way to Wisdom, transl. Ralph Manheim, 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1954, p. 66. 
[Henceforth cited as WW]
3 Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History, transl. 
Michael Bullock, New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press 1953, p. 236. [Henceforth cited as OGH]
Historical and Biographical Backgrounds
When Ortega y Gasset was fifteen years old, he 
witnessed an event that would have a particularly 
important impact on his philosophical thought as well 
as on the history of his country that ensued: in 1898, 
Spain lost its last vestiges of an illustrious past of wealth 
and global dominance when the Americans swiftly won 
the Spanish-American War (with armed conflict lasting 
just a few months). This resulted in the loss of Cuba 
and the Philippines, the last territories of the Spanish 
empire. The resulting damage to the overall National 
identity of the Spanish people was one factor among 
many that left the nation open to many of the perilous 
trends that would arise in the first half of the twentieth 
century, such as, for example, the most devastating 
events taking place during the Spanish Civil War from 
1936-1939. It ended with the rise of one other of these 
disastrous trends of the early twentieth century, namely 
fascism, with the rule of dictator Francisco Franco, who 
would remain as the head of the nation until his death 
in 1975. These directions, among others, were of course 
deeply troubling to Ortega, who due to these events 
had spent a significant period of his life abroad (most 
significantly, in Argentina as well as in Germany).
After the Spanish-American War, Spain was 
acutely divided on how to heal the damaged spirit 
and restore national confidence. A group of renowned 
artists and intellectuals formed at the end of the 
nineteenth century, appropriately termed Generación 
del '98, who were concerned with how to best direct the 
future of the country. A main division that arose within 
the Generation of '98 was between the hispanizantes and 
europeizantes. The former group was comprised of those 
who saw the solution to Spain's problems in looking 
back to tradition and by means of Hispanicizing their 
country to further shed foreign influence. The latter 
group included those who were looking ahead to 
other, more advanced, European nations of the time 
as models.  Ortega was a europeizante, part of the 
group that aspired to make Spain more European, 
and for him it was clear which advanced model he 
thought Spain should aspire to: Germany. He sought 
to immerse himself in German culture; hence, in 1905 
he visited the University of Leipzig, where he spent 
eight months. He returned to Germany after having 
passed a summer back in Madrid in order to spend 
a year at the University of Berlin and then another 
six months at the University of Marburg. It was in 
Marburg where he became especially influenced by 
30 Marnie Binder
http://www.existenz.us Volume 14, No. 1, Spring 2019
may re-interpret our potentials that have been shaped 
by the past: "Life is a gerundive,4 declares Ortega. 
Humankind makes itself as an "infinitely plastic entity...
to be as you like" he additionally declares (HS 203-
4). Humans are not wedged in a state of fixed being. 
"History," argues Ortega, "is the reality of man. He has 
no other. Through history he has made himself such as 
he is. To deny the past is foolish and illusory for the past 
is man's nature" (HS 61-2).
As historical beings, humans must never forget 
their past. This insight was particularly relevant 
regarding the two philosopher's own time. Jaspers 
writes: "there is one great anxiety: The world is pervaded 
by terrible forgetfulness."5 Certainly, the appearance 
of forward-focused totalitarian leaders resolved to 
destroy tradition and erase parts of history warranted 
this concern. Mussolini, for example, was also born in 
1883, the same year as Jaspers and Ortega. "No reality is 
more essential to our self-awareness than history" states 
Jaspers (WW 96).
History is the Ever-Flowing Progression of Time
History is the constant, ever-flowing progression of 
time. Jaspers writes:
Historicity is objectively and subjectively the absolute 
unrest caused by the instability of things in time. It 
is not the mere passing of things which we observe 
in processes of nature. Historicity relates the present 
to the past and to the future so as to penetrate mere 
temporality in continuous communication. [P2 342]
Historicity exists as a continuum in which the 
present is made up of events from the past, so the 
present is the past, and the past is present—as well as 
being the potential future. The same understanding 
of historicity as a continuum is also present in Ortega. 
This becomes apparent by Ortega's emphasis on how 
a human's being progresses in the sense of a constant 
process of becoming a self:
4 José Ortega y Gasset, History as a System, New York, 
NY: W.W. Norton & Company 1961, 61-2. [Henceforth 
cited as HS]
5 Karl Jaspers, "Vom Europäischen Geist (1946)," in 
Rechenschaft und Ausblick, Munich, DE: Piper & Co 
Verlag 1951, pp. 233-64, here p. 261. Cited and transl. 
John Hennig, "Jaspers' Attitude Towards History," in 
The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp, 
Carbondale, IL: Open Court Publishing Company 
1981, pp. 565-91, here p. 587.
The experiments already made with life narrow man's 
future. If we do now know what he is going to be, we 
know what he is not going to be. Man lives in view 
of the past. Man, in a word, has no nature; what he has is 
history…Now concerning man it must be said, not only 
that his being is variable, but also that his being grows 
and, in this sense, that it progresses. [HS 217-8]
Hence Ortega's frequent, albeit commonplace, 
plea that "we have a need of history in its entirety, not 
to fall back into, but to see if we can escape from it."6 
This possible future applicability of lessons from the 
past is one of the ways in which this account connects 
to pragmatism. Historical facts are corroborated over 
time and remain interesting, meaningful, and useful 
in the future as they continue being tested in and for 
the present. John Dewey defines this corroboration as 
"historical empiricism."7 There is no beginning and no 
end for the historical universe. Jaspers describes the 
passage of history as follows:
What in historical cognition is thus ultimately nothing 
but change within universal transience, change in 
causal relations of effect and aftereffect, an endless up 
and down in random diversity without beginning or 
end—this, to Existenz, is historic existence: not mere 
evanescence, but a listening to the past as well as the 
language of a possible future. It is the present as a 
coalescence of past and future into the substantial Now. 
[P2 348]
The intelligible historical field must be viewed as part 
of a continuum, argues Ortega, which
when it is a partial reality, does not end in itself, but 
continues in another thing, and to begin by isolating 
it is to run the risk of cutting it off, leaving outside 
what is perhaps its most important part.8
6 José Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses, New 
York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton & Company 1932, p. 96. 
[Henceforth cited as RM] It is noted in this edition, 
"This translation, authorized by Sr. Ortega y Gasset, 
remains anonymous at the translator's request."
7 John Dewey, "The Structure of Experience," in The 
Philosophy of John Dewey: Two Volumes in One, ed. John 
J. McDermott, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press 1981, pp. 1-354, here p. 50.
8 José Ortega y Gasset, An Interpretation of Universal 
History, transl. Mildred Adams, New York, NY: W.W. 
Norton & Company 1975, p. 65. [Henceforth referred 
to as IUH]
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reality of humans: a self has to navigate through the 
waves of historical circumstances. Ortega often uses the 
image of being shipwrecked; one constantly needs to 
steer oneself and this creates insecurities and anxiety—
these are very existentialist themes indeed. One must 
constantly decide what to do, and which identity to 
assume, and this always occurs in a context of specific 
and limiting, historical circumstances. Jaspers expresses 
a similar idea: "I come to exist by participating in my 
active world…I do not exist without the world" (P2 
45). As Ortega presupposes the reality of the past and a 
radical reality of humans as being self and circumstance, 
an insistence on representative realism can be noticed. 
In this context, history is understood broadly as not just 
one's own specific past, but all the past that has come 
prior to a given life. Humans are nothing without their 
histories; as Ortega argues, "experience of life is not 
made up solely of my past, of the experiences that I 
personally have had. It is built up also of the past of my 
forebears, handed down to me by the society I live in" 
(HS 210).
As I have mentioned above, Jaspers similarly finds 
human traditions to be the most distinct variable for 
being human. His view stresses in a universalizing 
manner the objective of achieving true unity via an 
existential historic consciousness. Likewise, also Ortega 
clearly shared this emphasis on tradition, as he argues: 
"Man is never the first man but begins his life on a 
certain level of accumulated past" (HS 81). Ortega often 
asserts that human beings are not things but dramas—
this can also be seen in the anxiety that is caused 
through finding oneself in a situation comparable 
to being shipwrecked. In this drama, humans must 
live authentically. The first steps humans take in 
working toward living authentically are influenced 
by the interpretations one makes of the surrounding 
circumstances of one's time that lead to the creation of a 
system of convictions that add to defining the historical 
spirit of the time. The more authentically humans live, 
Ortega argues, the more authentic are the predictions 
about the future, for humans live in the passing of 
generations in constant prophecy.10 This is a key variable 
of Ortega's methodology for historiography; historical 
study involves, in part, finding these moments of crisis 
when a system of beliefs has failed, and thus it forms 
pivotal points in between periods of change when a 
Norton & Company 1961, p. 45.
10 José Ortega y Gasset, En torno a Galileo, Madrid, ES: 
Biblioteca Nueva 2005, p. 185. [Henceforth cited as TG].
The Historical Determinacy of the Continuum 
of Human Beings
The continuum itself is the most important variable 
Ortega refers to, as this is one's foundation for being, 
which is continuously in a process of becoming. A 
similar perspective can be found in Jaspers:
Existence is historic because it defies completion in 
time, because it is restlessly self-generating, because it 
is never in a state of harmony. Its anatomical features 
demand that we change—a challenge that does not 
cease in temporal existence. [P2 221]
Human nature is, hence, historical change. In a similar 
way, Ortega argues:
Human life is thus not an entity that changes 
accidentally, rather the reverse: in it the "substance" 
is precisely change, which means that it cannot be 
thought of Eleatically as substance. [HS 205]
The reference here is to Parmenides and Zeno's belief 
in the unity of being. For Ortega, the historicity of 
humans is defined as the interconnectedness of self and 
circumstance being embedded in a temporal chain of 
constant change.
As we have seen, the past speaks to human beings; 
the future cannot do so—despite one's forward-looking 
tendencies. Humans exist as part of a continuum of past-
present-future. Existence is reflexive. Human existence 
has historical determinacy as always beings embedded 
in a historical moment and within concrete, specific 
historical circumstances, as Jaspers explains: "Being 
phenomenal, unconditional action is temporally defined 
and thus historically concrete" (P2 288). For Ortega, 
reason arises from human life, and as human beings 
are historical existences that are always embedded in 
historical circumstances, historical reason is, therefore, 
central for understanding: "To comprehend anything 
human, be it personal or collective, one must tell its 
history...Life only takes on a measure of transparency in 
the light of historical reason" (HS 214).
Historical Determinacy as the Radical Reality 
of Self and Circumstance
For Ortega, historical determinacy exists as self and 
circumstance: "I am myself plus my circumstance, and if 
I do not save it, I cannot save myself."9 This is the radical 
9 José Ortega y Gasset, Meditations on Quixote, transl. 
Evelyn Rugg and Diego Marín, New York, N.Y.: W. W. 
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society is left without a stable world. By reflecting upon 
the world during such unstable times a state of negative 
convictions is present, as humans always have some 
sort of convictions. Stabilization sets in by developing 
new convictions. The same process may apply to an 
individual.
Historical determinacy refers to the fact that 
humans are always being embedded in a historical 
moment, yet this does not mean that they have no 
free will. Jaspers describes this situation as the first 
boundary situation, namely
in existence I am always in a particular situation...I exist in 
certain social circumstances at a certain time in history; 
I am a man or a woman, young or old, directed by 
opportunities and chances. The boundary situation 
of being subject to the singular constraint of my data 
derives its poignancy from the contrasting thought of 
man at large and of his due in any state of perfection...
The unrest in this boundary situation is that what is 
up to me lies still ahead; my freedom in it is to assume 
given facts, to make them my own as if they had been 
my will. [P2 183-4]
Limit situations, often also translated as border 
or boundary situations, awaken us through the 
questioning of these significant moments. This is 
arguably comparable to Ortega's notion of those 
pivotal moments of crises in history when new ideas 
that occur in a generation or in an individual are 
being converted into beliefs that are intrinsic to that 
generation or individual. In Ortega's philosophy, 
humans coexist with their beliefs; and essentially exist 
within them. One may take beliefs for granted. Until 
moments of crisis occur, beliefs can be so ingrained 
that the individual never questions them. In Ortega's 
view, most beliefs have been inherited by previous 
generations. One experiences doubts about one's 
existence, and ideas arise to fill in the thus arisen 
gaps, which may later convert into beliefs—and so the 
process repeats itself. This cycle of changing beliefs is 
clearly revealed in history.
Historical consciousness, or one's ability to observe 
and learn about past events, as Jaspers defines it, may 
or may not relate to personal lives—until, that is, one 
possesses a consciousness of one's historicity that is 
part of Existenz; or, in other words, that is part of how 
one understands and exists within this knowledge 
of present times as a continuation of a past that has 
been lived by previous existences. For Jaspers, in the 
existential historic consciousness 
 the self becomes aware of its historicity as the only 
reality it has. The historic consciousness of Existenz 
must be personal in origin. It makes me aware of 
myself in communication with other historic self-
being; I as myself am phenomenally bound in time to a 
sequence of singular situations, my given situation. [P2 
104-5] 
This is comparable to the cornerstone of Ortega's 
philosophy of the radical reality being self and 
circumstance, in contrast to this Jaspers' emphasis is 
primarily on human circumstances. In part, Jaspers' 
Existenz is an individual recording of changing 
circumstances. The past does not condition one to walk 
entirely determined paths; rather, one can accept or 
not accept details about the past as being relevant for 
present and future—this constitutes another connection 
to pragmatism.
Historical Perspectivism
The access to this radical reality can be found in the 
concept of historical perspectivism. Jaspers' historical 
consciousness refers to the consciousness of an 
individual's present historical circumstances, or in 
his words, "This unity of myself with my existence as 
a phenomenon is my historicity and awareness of it is 
historic consciousness" (P2 121). In other words, there 
are two steps in this process of unification. First, by 
being aware of the present historical situation one 
can learn from the past, but this does not yet imply 
a connection to one's personal life—one only has 
historical consciousness. In the second step, by making 
this personal connection, a consciousness of one's 
historicity is being gained. This conversion forms 
epistemological and metaphysical foundations for the 
interpretation of one's circumstance and of humans, 
at any given time. In it, the unique historical moment 
and one's individual place can be recognized. While 
this recognition is relative to an individual, it does 
provide epistemological progress and a metaphysical 
structural framework for the interpretation of historical 
reality. History does not produce the self; history is 
within the self—hence why the different perspectives 
of different selves open the window wider into deeper 
understanding of individual and collective existence.
Perspectivism is another cornerstone of Ortega's 
philosophy, yet this view that reality is being perceived 
from one's own point of view is not meant to be solipsistic 
but rather is indicative of representative realism. Again, 
a similar stance is found in Jaspers who also strived to 
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overcome the trappings of a strict relativism. In fact, it is 
the gathering of perspectives embedded in a historical 
epoch that should be the focus of historical study; the 
more historical details are being collected, the more 
one can see through the window of historical reality. 
All warranted assertions of knowledge are perceptions 
that are embedded in a specific time and space. Ortega's 
perspectivism reveals that it is not that one proclaimed 
truth is true or false; rather there are multiple truths and 
falsities, and the one falsity is to say that there is only 
one truth, just as it is false to say that there is only one 
perspective; things cannot be truthful nor false, and 
what is false is so on the grounds of the judgment made 
that something is true or false.11
It is unlikely to capture a complete picture of 
complex matters in one perspective only. Thus, it is 
necessary to gather several perspectives, and by doing 
so the window into understanding human reality 
indeed opens up—like pieces of a puzzle—and with 
it the more strongly warranted become assertions in 
human history and historiography. Historians and 
historiographers must indeed focus on capturing and 
preserving perspectives of the present times as well 
as on ones looking back in time. History books also 
provide some data about the time they were prepared, 
published, and continued being in circulation, along 
with the contents in and of themselves. A history of 
Ancient Rome was interpreted and subsequently 
written very differently in the Enlightenment as 
opposed to a present-time one, for example, so some 
of the historical time of the publication can be captured 
by considering the different interpretative recordings 
in a pragmatist sense. One should also explore more of 
why those specific details or focuses were interesting, 
useful, and meaningful to record at the time, and, 
therefore, examine what they might tell one about that 
time of interpreting, writing, publishing, and continued 
circulation. Thus, a text on ancient Rome written in the 
Enlightenment can also provide information about 
what was useful, interesting, and meaningful for the 
writer and audience in the Enlightenment at the time 
it was being written and published, along with the 
11 Ortega emphasizes this point in many instances 
within his writings. For example he writes, "reality, 
like a landscape, has infinite perspectives, all of 
which are equally true and authentic. The only false 
perspective is the one that assumes to be the only 
one" (my translation). José Ortega y Gasset, El tema 
de nuestro tiempo, Madrid, ES: Alianza Editorial 2006, 
p. 149.
content provided about the history of ancient Rome. 
Contemporary knowledge indeed exists in a historical 
form for one is always limited not only by what may 
be interesting, meaningful, and useful in a pragmatist 
sense, at any particular moment, and among specific 
limiting circumstances, individually or as a society, 
but also by the tools available for interpretation, 
understanding, and recording in a given historical 
moment.
Ortega has strong pragmatist elements in his 
philosophy, despite his fervent rejection of the North 
American philosophical tradition. Arguably, there is 
some pragmatist philosophy in Jaspers as well. Jaspers 
argues for instance: "History is seen in hierarchies of 
values, in its origins, in its crucial stages. The real is 
divided up into the essential and the inessential" (OGH 
262). Hierarchies of values are, in part, pragmatically 
determined. Moreover, as "historical beings," it is 
noteworthy that both Jaspers and Ortega came to age 
between one and two generations after the first major 
American Pragmatists: Charles Peirce, William James, 
and John Dewey. Thus, both Jaspers and Ortega had 
been formally educated as adults at a time when key 
pragmatists texts already had been in circulation. 
Although the initial acceptance of pragmatism was 
weak in Europe, nonetheless it did have a presence. 
For example, during the 1920s Julius Goldstein at the 
University of Darmstadt, was one of the early defenders 
of American pragmatism in Germany. James, in fact, 
kept frequent correspondence with Goldstein, hoping 
to inspire more pragmatist thought in Germany. And in 
Spain, Dewey's works were first translated by students 
of Ortega.
Whereas one might not be able to discern when 
pragmatic focuses in history describe an objective 
historical reality, this is an accepted practice in the 
pragmatist tradition, and this lack of discernment 
nonetheless is acceptable by virtue of the insights 
gained from historical events—this provides 
valuable knowledge about humans as historical 
beings and about humankind as historical entities. 
The pragmatist dialogue has much to contribute to 
discussions on epistemological possibility and the 
metaphysics of humankind as being a historical event. 
What can be considered interesting, meaningful, and 
useful needs to be attested over time, therefore part 
of the methodology of pragmatism stems from the 
past. The selection of historical details for analysis, 
recording and subsequent writing are largely 
pragmatically determined. As historical beings, 
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historical consciousness that leads to a consciousness 
of historicity can be pragmatically understood as 
being largely shaped by how elements that are 
being preserved must make a practical, useful, and 
meaningful difference in the life of humans, and at 
least some of the rest that is not preserved is being 
ignored, consciously or not.
The systematic quality of Ortega's "historical 
perspectivism" can be understood through his theory of 
generations. In Ortega's philosophy, historical reality is 
determined by the divisions of generations, specifically 
defined in groups of fifteen-year increments, with 
particular influence attributed to the two generations 
between the ages of thirty-to-sixty. "Each generation 
represents an essential piece, un-transferable and 
unrepairable, of historical time, of the vital trajectory 
of humankind," and "Every human generation 
carries within itself all the previous generations and 
as such, it is a perspective of universal history" (TG 
93-4, my translation). The generation one belongs to 
is critical (because as historical beings, humans can 
share proximity in time and date). Ortega argues that 
people of the same generation, yet of different cultures 
are more similar than those of different generations 
that share the same culture. This is represented in the 
Spanish terms coetáneo (coeval or coetaneous) and 
contemporáneo (contemporary), the former referring to 
being of the same age, and the latter referring to being 
of the same historical time period. A generational group 
is a projection of a set of perspectives that provide 
a window into historical reality and knowledge—
especially if captured in the present moment, given 
the afore-mentioned important pragmatist framework 
to consider. Jaspers endorses a similar idea: "A few 
generations cohere in typical stylistic sequences or 
developments of thought, from their origin to their 
disintegration" (OGH 255).
The concept of truth can be replaced with what 
should be more properly termed "a warranted 
historical fact," if one borrows from Dewey the 
notion of warranted assertions, in order to employ 
the ensuing method into a pragmatist philosophy 
of history. James offers a summary of the pragmatist 
methodology:
What difference would it practically make to 
anyone if this [any] notion rather than that notion 
were true? If no practical difference whatever can 
be traced, then the alternatives mean practically 
the same thing, and all dispute is idle. Whenever a 
dispute is serious, we ought to be able to show some 
practical difference that must follow from one side 
or the other's being right.12
This notion could also very well be any historical 
assertion.
Conclusion
As historical beings, studying history is indispensable 
for epistemology, metaphysics, ethics—any cognitive 
event that is related to human life thus has a human 
history. Humans are historical beings. Historians and 
historiographers must work to avoid the trappings 
of the lure of storytelling that may lead to a wider 
audience, but at the expense of historical accuracy 
when the focus shifts to the way in which the story 
is told rather than by paying attention to the actual 
contents. The concepts of history and story are indeed 
different; the former aims to refer to objective events, 
whereas the latter refers to subjective events. Thus, 
history is not mere storytelling; one must avoid, as 
Jaspers argues, studying history in a way "that merely 
thrills, and from a mythicizing historiography that 
consciously produces an intentional and therefore 
untrue history" (P3 160). This is also why unearthing 
the pragmatist elements in Jaspers' and Ortega's 
philosophy of history and historiography is valuable, 
since a pragmatist view provides an additional layer 
of historical knowledge about humans as historical 
beings. Ortega also commands that "this admirable 
vocation called 'history' can now stop being mere 
story-telling or, at best, excellent technique—
admirable, necessary, highly respected but mere 
technique—and become true science."13 As Jaspers 
further similarly states: "History will cease to be a mere 
field of knowledge, and become once again a question 
of the consciousness of life and of existence; it will 
cease to be an affair of aesthetic culture, and become 
the earnestness of hearing and response" (OGH 266). 
Indeed, history is a vital source for further knowledge 
about human experiences and existences.
12 William James, Pragmatism, New York, NY: Dover 
Publications 1995, p. 18.
13 José Ortega y Gasset, Historical Reason, transl. Philip 
W. Silver, New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company 
1984, p. 49
